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Isolation for Profit: How Privately
Provided Video Visitation Services
Incentivize Bans on In-Person
Visitation Within American
Correctional Facilities
J. Tanner Lusk*
Abstract
American correctional facilities are banning in-person
visitation in lieu of privately provided and expensive video
visitation services. This Note discusses the types of private services
provided; how video visitation negatively affects inmates’ mental
health and finances; and the ongoing legal battle occurring in Knox
County, Tennessee, regarding whether the Knox County Jail’s ban
on in-person visitation violates the Constitution. Because of the
significant degree of deference courts grant correctional facilities
when considering whether challenged regulations violate the
Constitution, it will be difficult for the Knox County Jail inmates to
successfully argue that the jail has violated their constitutional
rights. There are, however, other methods to challenging bans on
in-person visitation. Through political advocacy, individuals and
organizations have successfully motivated counties throughout the
United States to overturn and prohibit bans on in-person visitation.
Going forward, political advocacy seems like the best method for
challenging these bans.
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I. Introduction
“A new system called ‘video visitation’ is replacing in-person
jail visits with glitchy, expensive Skype-like video calls. It’s
inhumane, dystopian and actually increases in-prison violence—
but god, it makes money.”1
Private companies are increasingly controlling the methods by
which prisoners communicate with their family and friends.2
Companies, such as Securus Technologies (Securus), implement
and manage phone-call systems, electronic messaging systems,
and video-conferencing systems in correctional facilities.3
1. Jack Smith, IV, The End of Prison Visitation, MIC (May 5, 2016),
https://mic.com/articles/142779/the-end-of-prison-visitation#.5J6dSZ78a
(last
updated Sept. 6, 2016) (last visited Nov. 24, 2019) (emphasis added)
[https://perma.cc/2B42-GU43].
2. Id.
3. See About Us, SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES, https://securustech.net/about-us/
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Although these services allow greater access to communication for
some inmates, in many cases, correctional facilities across the
nation use this technology to replace in-person visitation.4
In Knox County, Tennessee, the Knox County Sheriff’s Office
has banned in-person visitation within its facilities in lieu of video
visitation.5 As a result of the ban, Knox County’s inmates can only
visit with friends, family, and others through Securus’s video
calls.6 Knox County inmates filed a proposed civil rights class
action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Tennessee on December 23, 2018.7 In the complaint,
plaintiffs allege that the Knox County Sheriff’s Department
violated the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution by “aboli[shing] . . . all in-person
visitation . . . .”8 This Note considers whether the ban violates the
Knox County inmates’ constitutional rights and, if litigating the
constitutional concerns proves to be an insufficient method for
challenging the bans, whether political advocacy can be a
successful alternative.

(last visited Nov. 24, 2019) (“[W]e help maintain relationships between inmates
and their family and friends through easy to use inmate calling options and video
visitation from anywhere using Apple® or Android® smartphones, tablets or
PCs.”) [https://perma.cc/TP8V-VZR8].
4. See Debra Weiss, Another Jail Eliminates In-Person Visits and Adopts
50-Cent-a-Minute
Video
Visitation,
A.B.A.
J.
(July
24,
2018),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/another_jail_eliminates_free_in_person
_visits_and_adopts_video_visitation (last visited Nov. 24, 2019) (“[A]n estimated
600-plus correctional facilities across the country have implemented some form of
video calling. About three-quarters of the jails that implement the technology ‘end
up eliminating or scaling back in-person visits . . . .’”) [https://perma.cc/8Z63QVB4].
5. See KNOX COUNTY SHERIFF, POLICY AND PROCEDURE MANUAL ch. 12, at 2
(“Knox County Correctional Facilities use video visitation as the only method for
personal visits.”) [hereinafter KNOX COUNTY SHERIFF].
6. See Exhibit 4: Knox County (TN) Proposed Contract with Securus,
PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE 2, https://static.prisonpolicy.org/messaging/Exhibit4.pdf
(last visited Nov. 24, 2019) (“County hereby contracts with Contractor to provide
for . . . an
Inmate
Communication
and
Management
System,
including . . . Inmate Phone System, Inmate Communications (Kiosks/Tablets),
Inmate Visitation, [and] Electronic Messaging . . . .”) [https://perma.cc/E7N9H9LA].
7. Complaint for Plaintiffs, Amble et al. v. Spangler et al., No.
3:2018cv00538 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 23, 2018).
8. Id. at 1.

342

26 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 339 (2019)
II. Video Visitation Services

Providing goods and services to prisons is a booming business
for private companies.9 Ahmad Afzal, owner of Fine Cotton
Textiles, which manufactures prison jumpsuits, underwear, and
suicide safety smocks for U.S. prisons, recognized this when he
stated that “[b]usiness is very good . . . [b]ecause crime is crazy and
there are lots of inmates. . . . [T]he number of customers is
increasing every day.”10 Private companies provide services for
communication,11 medical care,12 food,13 transportation,14 and
probation.15 This Note focuses on Securus’s video visitation
services.
Video visitation allows inmates incarcerated far from home to
communicate with their family and friends; bypasses restrictive
jail visitation hours and policies that can prevent working
9. See Timothy Williams, The High Cost of Calling the Imprisoned, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 30, 2015, § A, at 12 (reporting that the prison phone system is a $1.2
billion-a-year industry).
10. Rupert Neate, Welcome to Jail Inc: How Private Companies Make Money
Off
U.S.
Prisons,
THE
GUARDIAN
(June
16,
2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jun/16/us-prisons-jail-privatehealthcare-companies-profit (last visited Nov. 24, 2019) [https://perma.cc/7QQ92TEA].
11. See U.S. For-Profit Privatized Correctional Services, PRISON LEGAL NEWS
(Jan. 2017), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/publications/list-major-profitprison-services-and-companies/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2019) (listing Global Tel*
Link, Securus Technologies, Century Link, Pay Tel, Telmate, NCIC, Consolidated
Telecom, ICSolutions, Legacy Inmate Communications, IWEBVisit, JPay,
HomeWAV, Turnkey Corrections, and JailATM as companies that provide
communication services to prisons) [https://perma.cc/3BK7-3DK5].
12. See id. (listing Corizon Health, Centurion, NaphCare, Correct Care
Solutions, Wexford Health Sources, Armor Corr. Health Services, Advanced
Correctional Healthcare, Correctional Medical Care, Southern Health Partners,
MHM, Cal. Forensic Medical Group, Southwest Correctional Medical Group, CFG
Health Systems, PrimeCare Medical, Inc., and Correct Health as companies
providing medical services to prisons).
13. See id. (listing Aramark, Canteen Corr. Services, Trinity Services Group,
ABL Management, and Food Services of America as companies providing food
services to prisons).
14. See id. (listing Transcor, PTS of America, U.S. Prisoner Transport
Services, Black Talon Enterprises, GEO Transport, and In-Custody
Transportation as companies providing transportation services to prisons).
15. See id. (listing Sentinel Offender Services, Judicial Correctional
Services, Georgia Probation Services, and CSRA Probation Services as companies
providing probation services).
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individuals, school-age children, the elderly, and the disabled from
visiting; and reduces the disruptive effect16 that visiting a jail can
have on children.17 Unfortunately, many correctional facilities
implementing video visitation policies focus more on generating
profits than on improving the quality and frequency of
communication.18
Securus is one of the leading providers of communication
systems to correctional facilities.19 Securus provides correctional
facilities with traditional telephone service,20 video visitation,21
and electronic messaging.22 Securus installs and manages
16. See Jasmine M. Hedge, Children of Incarcerated Parents: The Relation
of Contact and Visitation to the Parent-Child Relationship and Internalizing and
Externalizing Problems 30 (May 2016) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Clemson
University) (on file with Clemson Libraries, Clemson University)
Visitation policies are often cited as reasons for low rates of visitation,
as many family members encounter intimidating and uncomfortable
conditions that deter future contact. . . . [A]dolescents have reported
mixed feelings about visitation because there was no time to talk
individually, it involved unpleasant searches, and facilities were
physically uncomfortable.
17. See Bernadette Rabuy & Peter Wagner, Screening Out Family Time—
The For-Profit Video Visitation Industry in Prisons and Jails, PRISON POL’Y
INITIATIVE (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/visitation/report.html
(last visited Nov. 24, 2019) (listing benefits and drawbacks of video visitation
services in prisons) [https://perma.cc/Z2H7-QV6Z].
18. See Advocacy Groups Call for End to Ban on In-Person Visits at
Tennessee Jail, PRISON LEGAL NEWS, Oct. 8, 2018, at 23 (“It’s all about the
money.”).
19. See About Us, supra note 3 (“[W]e help maintain relationships between
inmates and their family and friends through easy to use inmate calling options
and video visitation from anywhere using Apple® or Android® smartphones,
tablets or PCs.”).
20. See
Phone
Products,
SECURUS
TECHNOLOGIES,
https://securustech.net/phone-products/index.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2019)
(discussing Securus’s phone services) [https://perma.cc/T6SK-GN38].
21. See
Video
Products,
SECURUS
TECHNOLOGIES,
https://securustech.net/video-products/index.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2019)
(“Securus Video Visitation is a fully web-based visitation system that allows
friends, family members, attorneys, and public officials to schedule and
participate in video visitation sessions with an inmate—from anywhere with
internet access using the free Securus app, computer or tablet.”)
[https://perma.cc/AL2L-H2BH].
22. See EMESSEGING, SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES, https://securustech.net/
emessaging/index.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2019) (providing a way to send
electronic text messages and photographs to inmates while also allowing the
inmate an opportunity to reply to the message if the sender attaches a return
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communication systems in correctional facilities without any
charge to the facility.23 The inmates pay to use Securus’s services,24
and the facilities housing the inmates receive lucrative25
commissions.26
In addition to commissions, Securus’s communication systems
also provide convenience to correctional facilities.27 The systems
allow facilities to provide communication between inmates and the
inmates’ families and friends while decreasing visitation traffic.28
Correctional facilities claim that decreasing visitation traffic
increases internal security and reduces staff needs.29
To increase revenue, Securus has, in the past, included
provisions in its contracts that required prisons to ban in-person
stamp) [https://perma.cc/BWZ2-2ZHA].
23. See SECURUS TECHNOLOGIES, REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL—170423 BAFO—
VIDEO
VISITATION
PINAL
COUNTY,
AZ
6–7
(2017),
http://www.pinalcountyaz.gov/Purchasing/Lists/ContractVendors/Attachments/4
58/Securus%20Technologies%20Contract.pdf (last visited Nov. 24, 2019)
(“[Securus] will provide all supervision, labor, materials, equipment, software,
storage, documentation, training, technical support, and supplies necessary to
furnish, install, implement, operate, and maintain our Web-based video visitation
system at no cost to Pinal County.”) [https://perma.cc/J9UQ-H6K8].
24. See
Video
Visitation,
SECURUS
TECHNOLOGIES,
https://securustech.net/video-products/video-visitation/index.html (last visited
Nov. 24, 2019) (listing “funding options” to use Securus Video Visitation)
[https://perma.cc/P6TD-AXV5].
25. See Smith, supra note 1 (“These deals are lucrative: In Los Angeles
County, for example, it brings in a baseline, contractual guarantee of $15 million
a year.”).
26. See FACE TO FACE KNOX, TO WHAT END?: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF THE
KNOX
COUNTY
JAIL’S
BAN
ON
IN-PERSON
VISITS
2
(2018),
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1H4JdRulGhQ9tKeMKUxsimxLsyE5nYlMF/view
(last visited Nov. 24, 2019)
Under the County’s current contract with Securus Technologies, the
County takes a 50% “commission” on every remote video call, which
goes into the County’s general revenue fund. Because Securus pays the
full cost of installing and operating the system, there is no need for the
county to charge an extra fee.
[https://perma.cc/9ZLA-X98R].
27. See id. (introducing reasons for the changes implemented by the Knox
County Sheriff’s office).
28. See id. (“When the ban was initiated, the Sheriff’s Office gave the
following reasons for eliminating in-person visits: Decreased visitation traffic—
requires less staff . . . .”).
29. See id. (stating that because of the ban no contraband would enter the
jail and that the chances for violence would be lessened).
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visitation.30 In a report by the Prison Policy Initiative, the
organization stated that the following provision was a common
element of Securus’s contracts: “For non-professional visitors,
Customer will eliminate all face to face visitation through glass or
otherwise at the Facility and will utilize video visitation for all
non-professional on-site visitors.”31 On May 6, 2015, Securus
announced that it would no longer explicitly require county jails
and state prisons to replace in-person visitation with video calls.32
Additionally, Securus has also included provisions in contracts
that detail commission rate increases that are conditional on the
prison meeting agreed-to-quotas.33 For instance, in a contract with
Maricopa County, Arizona, Securus included a provision that
stated the following:
Contractor shall provide an initial revenue share of ten percent
(10%) of gross revenues per month upon implementation of the
base Video Visitation System if the County reaches a minimum
usage rate of 8,000 paid visits for the given month. Upon
Contractor realizing $2,603,201.95 in gross revenue, as verified
by electronic tracking of visit usage times the visitation rate,
the revenue percentage shall increase to twenty percent (20%)
of gross revenue per month, regardless of visitation volume. The
30. See Securus Ends Its Ban on In-Person Visits, Shifts Responsibility to
Sheriffs,
PRISON
POL’Y
INITIATIVE
(May
6,
2015),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2015/05/06/securus-ends-ban/ (last visited Nov.
24, 2019) (“There is clear language banning in-person visits in 70% of the Securus
contracts we examined for our report . . . .”) [https://perma.cc/56Z4-Y26X].
31. Rabuy & Wagner, supra note 17.
32. See Securus Technologies Revises Video Visitation Policy—Defers to
Prison/Jail Officials on Rules for Onsite Visits, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (May 4,
2015,
6:22
PM),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/securus_technologies_revises_video_visitatio
n_policy-defers_to_prison-jail_officials_on_rules_for.pdf (last visited Nov. 24,
2019)
Securus examined our contract language for video visitation and
found . . . we were writing in language that could be perceived as
restricting . . . person-to-person contact . . . . So we are eliminating
that language and 100% deferring to the rules that each facility has
for video use by inmates.
[https://perma.cc/JNS9-8FBS].
33. See Exhibit 2: Maricopa County Video Visitation Contract, PRISON POL’Y
INITIATIVE 15, https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/7520964282.pdf (last updated Nov. 6,
2013) (last visited Nov. 24, 2019) (detailing the commission structure for revene
generation) [https://perma.cc/4QNF-LH9S].
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parties agree that the set commission rates shall be periodically
reviewed in relation to the actual visitation volume and gross
revenue and may be adjusted by mutual written consent.34

Provisions such as this provide jails with financial incentives
to curtail in-person visitation in lieu of video visitation.
Because of a desire to increase facility security and produce
revenue, some facilities have completely banned in-person
visitation in lieu of visitation solely through video visitation,
provided by Securus and similar providers.35 Currently, 600
correctional facilities in forty-six states have implemented some
sort of video visitation system, and each year, more of those
facilities ban in-person visitation.36 The Prison Policy Initiative
reported that as of 2015, of the jails that implemented video
visitation within their facilities, seventy-four percent of those jails
banned in-person visitation.37
Currently, the constitutionality of blanket-bans on in-person
visitation is being litigated in Knox County, Tennessee.38
III. Knox County Jail
Knox County Jail, located in Knox County, Tennessee, houses
approximately 1000 inmates.39 In April 2014, Knox County
eliminated in-person visitation between inmates and outside
visitors.40 In place of in-person visitation, Knox County
34. Id.
35. See Weiss, supra note 4 (“Lucius Couloute, an expert at the Prison Policy
Initiative, told Ars Technica and the Guardian that . . . 600-plus correctional
facilities . . . have implemented some form of video calling. About three-quarters
of the jails . . . end up eliminating or scaling back in-person visits . . . .’”).
36. See Smith, supra note 1 (discussing the trend of correctional facilities
implementing video visitation technology).
37. See Rabuy & Wagner, supra note 17 (“The record is not always clear
about whether the jails or the companies drive this change, but by banning
in-person visits, it is clear that the jails are abandoning their commitment to
correctional best practices.”).
38. Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7.
39. See FACE TO FACE KNOX, supra note 26, at 3 (“With a population of about
1000 inmates at the Detention Facility, this means there are, on average, ten
more assaults every month.”).
40. See FACE TO FACE KNOX, supra note 26, at 2 (“Since April 2014, the Knox
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implemented a video conference system, which Securus installed
and manages.41
Inmates who wish to visit with family and friends must use
Securus’s video conference system.42 Inmates can use the system
in two ways.43 First, those who choose to communicate with the
inmate can drive to the Knox County Jail and use a kiosk within
the jail to video call the inmate for free.44 Second, those who choose
to communicate with the inmate can remotely call the inmate at a
cost of $5.99 for fifteen minutes.45 In addition to video-calling,
inmates may also use tablets provided by Knox County Jail to
message and email others.46 Inmates may either purchase the
tablet for $425, rent it for five dollars per day, or borrow it for
fifteen minutes at no charge.47
The Knox County Jail says that its primary reason for banning
in-person visitation is its concern over safety within the facility,
but opponents of the ban argue that the primary motivation of the
county is to make money.48 For every fifteen-minute remote video
call, Knox County pockets $2.62 of the $5.99 charge as a

County Sheriff’s Office has banned in-person visits at all county jail facilities.”).
41. See FACE TO FACE KNOX, supra note 26, at 2 (“Because Securus pays the
full cost of installing and operating the system, there is no need for the county to
charge an extra fee.”).
42. See KNOX COUNTY SHERIFF, supra note 5, at 2 (“Knox County Correctional
Facilities use video visitation as the only method for personal visits.”).
43. See KNOX COUNTY SHERRIF, supra note 5, at 2 (detailing different ways
video visitation can be used).
44. See KNOX COUNTY SHERRIF, supra note 5, at 2 (stating that visitors can
utilize kiosks for personal video visitation at no charge).
45. See KNOX COUNTY SHERRIF, supra note 5, at 2 (“There is a charge of $5.99
per thirty (30) minute visit.”).
46. See Knox County Commission Passes Resolution to Supply Inmates with
Tablets, WVLT (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.wvlt.tv/content/news/Knox-CountyCommission-passes-resolution-to-supply-inmates-with-tablets-420077863.html
(last visited Nov. 24, 2019) [hereinafter Knox County Commission Resolution)
(discussing Knox County’s purchase of 900 tablets, how the county intended to
use the tablets, and the public’s response to the purchase)
[https://perma.cc/VKV5-V39K].
47. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 11 (“Inmates get 15 minutes
a day with the tablets unless they have a gold pass, but gold passes cost $5.99 a
day.”).
48. See FACE TO FACE KNOX, supra note 26, at 2 (“[T]he video call system
makes money for the County, while in-person visits do not.”).
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“commission.”49 From March 2014 to November 2017, Knox County
earned $68,777.00 from the “commissions.”50 In total, over the past
four years, remote visits have brought in $164,000 in total
revenue.51 Of that $164,000, $79,000 went to Knox County and the
rest went to Securus.52
Knox County has not provided data that supports its
argument that the ban would increase the jail’s security. Knox
County stated that banning in-person visitation would decrease
visitation traffic, which would reduce the amount of staff needed
at the facility; reduce the amount of contraband entering the
facility; and reduce the risk of violence in the facility.53
Face to Face Knox, “a grass-roots coalition of citizens in Knox
County who seek just and humane treatment for incarcerated
individuals at the Knox County jail,”54 published a report on
January 29, 2018, To What End? Assessing the Impact of the Knox
County Jail’s Ban on In-Person Visits.55 In its report, Face to Face
Knox found that the potential benefits bolstered by the Knox
County Jail had not occurred and stated that “[t]he ban on
in-person visits makes the jail more dangerous, does nothing to
stop the flow of contraband, and strips money away from the
pockets of families.”56 The report found that contraband coming
into the jail had not decreased, that assaults had increased among
the 1000 inmates by an average of ten assaults per month, and
that the rate of disciplinary infractions had increased.57
49. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 14 (discussing the financial
details of the ban).
50. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 14 (outlining the
profitability of the program at paragraph 74).
51. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 14 (“[M]ore than $164,000
in total revenue of the past four years . . .”).
52. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 14 (“About $79,000.00 went
back into county coffers and the rest into profits for provider Securus
Technologies.”) (internal citations omitted).
53. See FACE TO FACE KNOX, supra note 26, at 2 (listing some reasons the
Knox County Sheriff’s Office eliminated in-person visitation).
54. Face to Face Knox (@F2FKnox), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/f2fknox
(last visited Nov. 24, 2019) [https://perma.cc/36L9-REJR].
55. FACE TO FACE KNOX, supra note 26.
56. FACE TO FACE KNOX, supra note 26, at 2.
57. See FACE TO FACE KNOX, supra note 26, at 3 (discussing Face to Face
Knox’s contrary findings).
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On December 23, 2018, Knox County inmates filed a proposed
civil rights class action lawsuit in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Tennessee.58 The plaintiffs allege that
the Knox County Sheriff’s Department violated the First, Eighth,
and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution regarding
“its abolition of all in-person visitation . . . .”59
In the complaint’s statement of facts, plaintiffs stated that
their friends and family members are forced to use kiosks if they
wish to communicate with the inmate at the jail; that remote video
calls cost $5.99 for fifteen minutes; that it is difficult to get access
to a kiosk; and that the kiosks are prone to technical issues such
as a blurry screen, loss of video feed, and communication ending
prematurely without providing a refund to the inmate for time not
used.60
In the plaintiffs’ claim for relief, under Count One, the
plaintiffs claim that ending in-person visitation in lieu of Knox
County Jail’s “pay to view” policy violates plaintiffs’ rights under
the Fourteenth, First, and Eighth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution.61 First, the plaintiffs claim that they have a
constitutional right to in-person visitation.62 Second, the plaintiffs
claim that the ban violates the inmates’ First Amendment right of
intimate association and is not reasonably related to a valid
penological objective.63 Third, the plaintiffs claim that the
defendants’ “arbitrary” ban on in-person visitation between
inmates and their family, friends, and employers violates the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual

58. Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7.
59. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 1–2 (outlining the class
action generally).
60. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 7–13 (compiling statements
from Knox County inmates regarding the shortcomings of video communication
technology at Knox County Jail).
61. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 22 (“The in-person
visitation ban violates the substantive due process mandate of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, and the First and Eighth
Amendments as applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
62. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 22 (outlining the inmates
claim for relief first as a violation of a constitutional right to personal visitation).
63. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 23 (“The ban on in-person
visitation . . is not reasonably related to a valid penological objective.”).
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punishment.64 Plaintiffs allege that the ban makes it difficult to
maintain relationships, which results in higher recidivism rates,
and that it is a “dramatic departure from accepted standards of
confinement.”65
In the plaintiffs’ Prayer for Relief, they request a declaration
that the defendants’ policies, practices, and customs violate the
United States Constitution; a finding that as a direct and
proximate result of defendants’ actions and inactions, plaintiffs
have suffered injuries entitling them to declaratory relief against
defendants; an injunction directing the defendants to end the ban
on in-person visitation within its facility; and an award of
nominal, punitive, and compensatory damages.66
IV. Burdens on Inmates and Their Families
Before addressing the constitutional issues discussed in the
plaintiffs’ proposed class action lawsuit, it is necessary to take a
closer look at the consequences that bans have on inmates’ mental
health and finances.
A. Mental Burdens
In the proposed class action lawsuit, plaintiff Alonzo Hoskins
stated that his mental health has deteriorated since being
incarcerated at the Knox County Jail.67 He stated that before
incarceration he never used psychiatric medications, but now he
does.68 He blames the deterioration on being “cut off from his
family” and the living conditions at the Knox County Jail.69 In

64. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 23 (introducing the inmate’s
allegation of cruel and unusual punishment).
65. Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 23.
66. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 33–35 (listing requests).
67. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 8 (discussing the mental
and physical deterioration of Alonzo Hoskins).
68. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 8 (“He never took
psychiatric medications before, but now he does.”).
69. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 8 (discussing the stress
experienced by Alonzo Hoskins).
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addition to his mental-health issues, Alonzo has lost weight, lost
hair, and experienced difficulty sleeping.70
The effects on Alonzo’s and others’ mental health should come
as no surprise. Psychologists have found that video visitation is
inferior to in-person visitation regarding the quality of interaction
between the participants.71 Video visitation falls short in six key
aspects.72 First, video calls increase the formality of the
conversation between participants, regardless of their
relationship.73 This means that participants are more likely to talk
at one another, rather than engage in a natural conversation.74
Second, visual signals that facilitate understanding between
participants, such as head nods, eye contact, and facial
expressions, are harder to recognize during video calls.75
Third, the process of establishing trust takes longer during
video communication than it would during in-person
communication.76 This is especially detrimental when the inmate
is communicating with doctors or young children.77 Fourth, there
is an absence of mutual eye contact, which interferes with

70. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 8 (describing the nature of
Alonzo Hoskins’s decline).
71. See Emily Widra, Seeing Eye to Eye: Understanding the Limits of Video
Visitation,
PRISON
POL’Y
INITIATIVE
(Apr.
11,
2016),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2016/04/11/eye-contact/ (last visited Nov. 24,
2019) (“While there are benefits to video communication, primarily regarding
long-distance communication, psychologists have repeatedly found numerous
differences
between
face-to-face
and
video
communication.”)
[https://perma.cc/LLK9-T4DU].
72. See id. (listing the ways in which video visitation falls short).
73. See id. (“Video communication increases the formality of the
conversation . . . .”).
74. See id. (“[P]eople are more likely to be talking at one another when they
are using video technology rather than having a more natural conversation.”).
75. See id. (“[V]isual signals that facilitate listener understanding. . . . such
as head nods, eye contact, and facial expressions, are key to in-person interactions
but are difficult to recognize in video communication.”).
76. See id. ([T]rust takes longer via video communication than in face-to-face
conversations . . . .”).
77. See id. (“This is especially worrisome . . . between incarcerated people
and doctors (tele-medicine) as well as between incarcerated parents and their
young children.”); see also Rabuy & Wagner, supra note 17 (“Video visitation can
add to the already significant trauma that children of incarcerated parents face,
especially for young children who are unfamiliar with the video technology.”).
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communication and reduces conversation fluidity.78 Fifth, video
communication deters participants’ willingness to express
intimacy and social connection.79 Sixth, the reduced content and
process coordination in video communication leads to quicker
conversations, reduced interactivity, and less complex
utterances.80
These differences between video visitation and in-person
visitation are significant considering the impact that in-person
visitation has on the inmate’s rehabilitation process and
recidivism rate.81 A study by the Minnesota Department of
Corrections found that “visits from family and friends offer a
means of establishing, maintaining, or enhancing social support
networks.”82 The study found that improving social bonds for
incarcerated offenders is important because it helps “prevent them
from assuming a criminal identity” and because “many released
prisoners rely on family and friends for employment opportunities,
financial assistance, and housing.”83 The improvement of these
social bonds reduces the inmate’s recidivism rate, meaning that
the more visits that someone receives in prison, the less likely he
is to commit another crime upon release.84

78. See Wildra, supra note 71 (“The absence of mutual eye contact and a
shared visual field disrupts communication and decreases conversation
fluidity . . .”).
79. See Wildra, supra note 71 (“[I]t is more difficult for people to express
intimacy and social connection with video communication.”).
80. See Wildra, supra note 71 (“The decreased content and process
coordination in video communication leads to shorter conversations, reduced
interactivity, and less complex utterances.”) (citations omitted).
81. See generally MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., THE EFFECTS OF PRISON VISITATION
ON
OFFENDER
RECIDIVISM
(2011),
https://mn.gov/doc/assets/1111MNPrisonVisitationStudy_tcm1089-272781.pdf (last visited Nov. 24, 2019)
(presenting findings on the effects of visitation on prisoner recidivism rates)
[https://perma.cc/3AJ5-4465].
82. Id. at 1.
83. Id. at 2.
84. See id. at 29 (“[F]indings suggest that prison visitation can improve
recidivism outcomes by helping offenders not only maintain social ties with both
nuclear and extended family . . . while incarcerated, but also by developing new
bonds such as those with clergy or mentors.”).
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In his dissent in Kentucky Department of Corrections v.
Thompson,85 Justice Marshall recognized the significant effect that
visitation has on recidivism:
Confinement without visitation “brings alienation and the
longer the confinement the greater the alienation. There is
little, if any, disagreement that the opportunity to be visited by
friends and relatives is more beneficial to the confined person
than any other form of communication.
“Ample visitation rights are also important for the family and
friends of the confined person. . . . Preservation of the family
unit is important to the reintegration of the confined person and
decreases
the
possibility
of
recidivism
upon
release. . . . [V]isitation has demonstrated positive effects on a
confined person’s ability to adjust to life while confined as well
as his ability to adjust to life upon release . . . .”86

Testimony from those burdened by bans on in-person
visitation add additional weight to the scientific findings.87 When
asked about the effects of an in-person visitation ban at the Travis
County Correctional Facility in Texas, inmates stated that when
using video call systems they cannot look the other participant in
the eye because “[i]t’s impossible” and the “personal, intimate
aspects” of their loved ones do not show.88 Lauren Johnson, a
visitor to the Travis County Correctional Facility, stated, “[i]t’s not
something you can quantify. Eye contact is a huge deal. It’s
blowing them kisses and putting your hands to the glass. The kids
get lost with the video terminals. It’s just not the same experience.
It’s a disconnected feeling.”89 Susan Gregory, wife to an inmate in
85. Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 465 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Kentucky regulations did not give state inmates a
liberty interest in visitation that is entitled to the protections of the due process
clause) (quoting National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
Model Sentencing and Corrections Act § 4–115, cmt. (1979)).
86. Id. at 468 (quoting National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, Model Sentencing and Corrections Act § 4–115, cmt. (1979)).
87. See Emily Wildra, In Their Own Words: The Value of In-Person
Visitation to Families, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (May 9, 2017),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/05/09/video-visitation-quotes/
(last
visited Nov. 24, 2019) (providing quotes from inmates and their loved ones on the
value of in-person visitation) [https://perma.cc/A5HG-SAMA].
88. See id. (describing the difficulties associated with video visitation
between prisoners and visitors).
89. Id.
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the Travis County facility stated, “Even if it’s through plexiglass,
at least you can have some kind of live interaction with your loved
one. That would have made it better for me and him to maintain
that human contact.”90
B. Financial Burdens
Use of Securus’s technology and services can be costly for
inmates and their families. At the Knox County Jail, one hour of
remote visitation every week for one year costs the visitor
$1246.00.91 Visitation is free if visitors use one of the kiosks located
inside of the jail, but that is not always an available or practical
option.92 Experienced Skype and Facetime users, who were
familiar with video calling, commented in an interview with the
Prison Policy Initiative that, while using Securus’s kiosks, they
have experienced the kiosks’ video feed freezing and becoming
blurry, video calls’ audio cutting in and out, and video calls ending
prematurely.93 As Ashika Coleman, an inmate located in Travis
County, Texas, heartbreakingly put it, “[i]t’s just too much
frustration to come down here, wait for an hour and then only get
25 minutes for a not-so-good call. I think the hassle is why people
don’t visit me as much anymore.”94
Prisoners can also use tablets to communicate, but in order to
get actual value out of the tablet, the prisoner must either
purchase the tablet for $42595 or rent it for $5.00 a day.96 Prisoners
90. Id.
91. Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 14 (“One hour of remote
visitation of every week for one year, costs $1246.00 to the visitor.”).
92. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 11 (outlining the prohibitive
cost of tablet use).
93. See Rabuy & Wagner, supra note 17 (“Video visitation is not ready for
prime time.”).
94. Zoe Erler, The Upside (And Downside) of Video Visitation, PRISON
FELLOWSHIP (May 12, 2016), https://www.prisonfellowship.org/2016/05/upsidedownside-video-visitation/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2019) [https://perma.cc/3PTGBGG6].
95. See Knox County Commission Resolution, supra note 46 (“The tablets will
be provided to inmates to give them a communication and management system.
Tablets will be sold to inmates at the cost of $425.”).
96. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 11 (“[G]old passes [allowing
the inmate to rent the tablet used for visitation] cost $5.00 a day.”).
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can also borrow tablets for free, but they are limited to fifteen
minutes a day.97 Prisoners complain that it is difficult to obtain
tablets and that fifteen minutes is not long enough, but they cannot
afford to pay $5.00 a day to rent a tablet.98
Because of the burdens on the wellbeing and finances of
inmates and their families, it is necessary that people challenge
bans on in-person visitation. Two available pathways for
challenging these bans are through litigation addressing
constitutional concerns and political advocacy.
V. Constitutional Arguments
In their proposed class action civil rights lawsuit against Knox
County Jail, plaintiffs claim the ban on in-person visitation
violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process
mandate; the First Amendment’s right to intimate association;
and the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment.99
In the following sections, this Note discusses the Fourteenth
Amendment’s substantive due process mandate, whether there is
a fundamental right to prisoner visitation that falls within the
scope of the substantive due process mandate, and whether Knox
County Jail’s ban on in-person visitation violates the Constitution.
A. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Substantive Due Process
Mandate
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides
that “nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of the law.”100 The Supreme Court’s
interprets the Fourteenth Amendment as providing two different
97. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 11 (“Inmates get 15 minutes
a day with the tablets . . . .”).
98. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 11 (outlining the prohibitive
cost of tablet use).
99. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 22–23 (alleging Counts 1
and 2, which describe violations of the Fourteenth, First, and Eighth
Amendments).
100. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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kinds of constitutional protection: procedural due process and
substantive due process.101
Substantive due process protects rights that are considered
“fundamental,” which are rights that are “implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty.”102 The Supreme Court has determined that
“most—but not all—of the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights
are fundamental . . . .”103 The Court has also determined that some
unenumerated rights are fundamental.104
If the Court finds that a right merits substantive due process
protection, then the right is “protected ‘against certain government
actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to
implement them.’”105 This approach “forbids the government to
infringe . . . ‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all . . . unless the
infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest.”106 If, however, an individual claims that the government
has interfered with a right of the individual and the right is not
considered a fundamental right, courts look at whether the
government had a legitimate government purpose in creating its
policy and whether the policy was rationally related to the
purpose.107
101. See McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1555 (11th Cir. 1994) (“The
Supreme Court’s interpretation of [the Due Process Clause] explicates that the
amendment provides two different kinds of constitutional protection: procedural
due process and substantive due process.”).
102. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324–25 (1937) (“[I]mmunities
that are valid as against the federal government by force of the specific pledges of
particular amendments have been found to be implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty, and thus, through the Fourteenth Amendment, become valid as against
the states.”).
103. McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1556.
104. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992)
[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates
most of the Bill of Rights against the States. It is tempting . . . to
suppose that liberty encompasses no more than those rights already
guaranteed . . . by the express provisions of the first eight
Amendments . . . . this Court has never accepted that view.
(citations omitted).
105. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (citing
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)).
106. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993) (citing Collins v. Harker Heights,
503 U.S. 115 (1992); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)); see also
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (outlining strict scrutiny analysis).
107. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955)
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B. Is There a Fundamental Right to Prisoner Visitation?
In Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, the Supreme
Court stated that inmates do not possess a due process right to
“unfettered visitation.”108 More recently, in Overton v. Bazzetta,109
the Court stated:
We do not hold, and we do not imply, that any right to intimate
association is altogether terminated by incarceration or is
always irrelevant to claims made by prisoners. We need not
attempt to explore or define the asserted right of association at
any length or determine the extent to which it survives
incarceration because the challenged regulations bear a
rational relation to legitimate penological interests.110

In his treatise, Rights of Prisoners, Michael Mushlin, professor
of law at Pace University, interprets the above quotations from
Thompson and Overton as begging the question of whether there
is a fundamental right, “not to ‘unfettered visitation’ but, rather,
to a program of reasonable visitation.”111 Professor Mushlin lists
several “solid foundations” on which to construct a constitutional
right to prison visitation.112
Professor Mushlin claims that the right to visitation may exist
“as an independent fundamental constitutional right under the
First Amendment . . . .”113 Mushlin points out that the Supreme
Court has recognized that the states are forbidden to unreasonably
(discussing rational basis review and finding that the challenged regulation had
no rational relation to the government’s objective, and therefore, it was beyond
constitutional bounds).
108. Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (“Respondents
do not argue—nor can it seriously be contended, in light of our prior cases—that
an inmate’s interest in unfettered visitation is guaranteed directly by the Due
Process Clause.”).
109. Overton v. Bazetta, 539 U.S. 126, 133–37 (2003) (finding that the prison
regulations satisfy the Turner v. Safley Test and do not violate the Eighth
Amendment).
110. Id. at 131–32.
111. 3 MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 13:2 (5th ed. 2018)
(quoting Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)).
112. See id. § 13:3 (introducing visitation as an independent fundamental
constitutional right).
113. Id.
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interfere with family relationships;114 that an unwed father has a
right to a hearing before termination of his parental rights;115 that
states cannot prohibit married individuals from using
contraceptives;116 and that there is a right of association grounded
in the free speech clause,117 which includes the “right to come
together for the purposes of expressing ideas”118 and which may be
“broad enough to encompass meetings and communications
between family and friends.”119 Professor Mushlin argues that case
law supports the proposition that “the state cannot, without some
justification, impose governmental policies that have the effect of
weakening family and social relationships[,]”120 and that within
the fundamental right to privacy in family relationships, there
could be an independent fundamental right to visitation.121
Based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Overton to avoid
explicitly declaring that there is a fundamental right to
visitation,122 and the Court’s hesitance to expand the collection of
114. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503–04 (1974) (“Our
decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family
precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition. It is through the family that we inculcate and pass down
many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural.”).
115. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (“Illinois parents are
constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness before their children are
removed from their custody. It follows that denying such a hearing to Stanley and
those like him while granting it to other Illinois parents is inescapably contrary
to the Equal Protection Clause.”).
116. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (“We deal with a
right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights . . . . Marriage is a coming together
for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being
sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life . . . .”).
117. See MUSHLIN, supra note 111, § 13:3 (“The Court also has recognized a
right of association grounded in the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.”
(citing NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958))).
118. MUSHLIN, supra note 111, § 13:3 (citing De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353
(1937)).
119. MUSHLIN, supra note 111, § 13:3 (citing Mayo v. Lane, 867 F.2d 374, 375
(7th Cir. 1989)).
120. MUSHLIN, supra note 111, § 13:3.
121. See MUSHLIN, supra note 111, §13:3 (“Thus, there is strong analytical
support for an independent constitutional entitlement found in the fundamental
constitutional right to privacy in family relationships that is implicated when
prisoners seek to visit their families.”).
122. See Overton v. Bazetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (“We need not attempt to
explore or define the asserted right of association at any length . . . .”).
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fundamental rights,123 it is unlikely that the Court will determine
that there is a fundamental right to visitation. Regardless of
whether there is a fundamental right to visitation as an extension
of the First Amendment right to association or not, the Court
applies rational basis review,124 which gives significant deference
to the government.125
The Supreme Court has required that when a prison policy
allegedly violates the First Amendment or the substantive due
process mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment, the government’s
policy only has to be rationally related to a legitimate government
interest to survive the challenge.126 When determining whether
the government has unconstitutionally infringed on a prisoners’
access to visitation, the Court applies either the Turner v. Safley127
test (in the case of convicted detainees) or the Bell v. Wolfish128 test
(in the case of pretrial detainees).

123. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (“[T]he
Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process
because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this uncharted area are
scarce and open-ended. . . . [J]udicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the
utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.”) (citations
omitted).
124. See Overton, 539 U.S. at 131–32 (2003) (“We need not attempt to explore
or define the asserted right of association at any length or determine the extent
to which it survives incarceration because the challenged regulations bear a
rational relation to legitimate penological interests.”).
125. Id. at 132 (“We must accord substantial deference to the professional
judgment of prison administrators, who bear a significant responsibility for
defining the legitimate goals of a corrections system and for determining the most
appropriate means to accomplish them.”).
126. See id. at 131–32 (“We need not attempt to explore or define the asserted
right of association at any length or determine the extent to which it survives
incarceration because the challenged regulations bear a rational relation to
legitimate penological interests.”).
127. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 99–100 (1987) (finding that the prison
regulation on correspondence was constitutionally valid and the regulation
prohibiting an inmate’s right to marry was unconstitutional).
128. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 520–22 (1979) (finding that the prison’s
“double-bunking” practice and the “publisher-only” rule were constitutionally
valid).
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C. Does Knox County’s Ban on In-Person Visitation Violate Either
the Turner v. Safley Test or Bell v. Wolfish Test?
1. Turner v. Safley Test
The Supreme Court has stated that when a prison regulation
interferes with a convicted detainee’s constitutional rights, “the
regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests.”129 When determining whether a prison
regulation violates a convicted detainee’s rights that are protected
by either the First Amendment or the substantive due process
mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment, courts apply the factors
stated in Turner v. Safley.130
In Turner v. Safley, the Supreme Court formulated “a
standard of review for prisoners’ constitutional claims that is
responsive both to ‘the policy of judicial restraint regarding
prisoner complaints and to the need to protect constitutional
rights.’”131 The Court listed factors relevant in determining the
reasonableness of a prison regulation.132 First, “there must be a
‘valid rational connection’ between the prison regulation and the
legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it.”133 A
regulation cannot stand where the connection between the
regulation and the asserted goal is “so remote as to render the
policy arbitrary or irrational.”134 The governmental objective must
also be “a legitimate and neutral one.”135
Second, courts must determine whether there are alternative
means to exercising the asserted right.136 In determining whether
129. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
130. See Overton v. Bazetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003) (“In Turner we held that
four factors are relevant in deciding whether a prison regulation affecting a
constitutional right that survives incarceration withstands constitutional
challenge . . . .”).
131. Turner, 482 U.S. at 85 (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 406
(1974)).
132. See id. at 89 (“As our opinions in Pell, Bell, and Jones show, several
factors are relevant in determining the reasonableness of the regulation at
issue.”).
133. Id. (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)).
134. Id. at 89–90.
135. Id. at 90.
136. See id. (“A second factor relevant in determing the reasonableness of a
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there are alternative means available to inmates for exercising a
constitutional right, the court is only concerned with whether some
alternative means exists, not with whether the alternative means
are ideal.137 Where there are alternative means, “courts should be
particularly conscious of the ‘measure of judicial deference owed to
corrections officials in gauging the validity of the regulation.’”138
Third, courts must consider “the impact accommodation of the
asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other
inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally.”139 If
the accommodation of an asserted right would have a significant
“ripple effect” on other inmates or prison staff, courts should be
“particularly deferential to the informed discretion of corrections
officers.”140
Fourth, the courts should consider whether there is evidence
of “ready alternatives,” which can suggest whether the regulation
is reasonable or not.141 If an inmate can point to an “alternative
that fully accommodates the prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost to
the penological interests,” a court can consider that as evidence
that the regulation is unreasonable.142
The Supreme Court has not applied the Turner v. Safley test
to determine whether a blanket prohibition on in-person visitation
violates the constitutional rights of affected prisoners. In Overton
v. Bazzetta, the Supreme Court applied the factors discussed in
Turner to determine whether a prison’s regulation placing
restrictions on visitation violated the First Amendment’s right of
association and the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due
process mandate.143 In Overton, the Michigan Department of
Corrections promulgated regulations limiting visitors after an
prison restriction, as Pell shows, is whether there are alternative means of
exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates.”).
137. See Overton v. Bazetta, 539 U.S. 126, 135 (2003) (specifying what the
court is to focus on).
138. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987) (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. 817, 827 (1974)).
139. Id. at 90.
140. Id.
141. See id. (“[T]he absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the
reasonableness of a prison regulation.”).
142. Id. at 91.
143. See Overton v. Bazetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132–36 (2003) (outlining and
applying the four factors from Turner).
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increase in visitation and substance abuse.144 Visitors, other than
clergy and attorneys, had to be included on an approved list.145
Minor children that were not either a child, step-child, grandchild,
or sibling of the inmate could not be included on the approved
list.146 Former inmates could also not be put on the approved list
unless they were an immediate family member of the inmate and
had approval from the facility’s warden.147 Prisoners who had two
or more substance-abuse violations were not allowed any visitors
other than clergy and attorneys, but could apply for visitation
privileges after two years.148
Prisoners sued the prison under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging
that visitation restrictions violated the First and Eighth
Amendments through the Fourteenth Amendment.149 The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan agreed
with the prisoners and concluded that the visitation restrictions
violated the constitutional rights of Michigan prisoners because
“[e]ven under the most deferential review, these restrictions are
not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”150 The
Sixth Circuit affirmed.151
The Supreme Court reversed and found that each factor of the
Turner test weighed in favor of the government.152 First, the Court
found that the regulations had a rational relation to the facility’s
legitimate penological interest in maintaining internal security
because the prison regulations were aimed at promoting internal
security, which the Court stated, was the “most legitimate of

144. See id. at 129 (“[P]rison officials found it more difficult to maintain order
during visitation and to prevent smuggling or trafficking in drugs.”).
145. See id. (discussing who was and who was not allowed to visit prisoners).
146. See id. at 126 (“[M]inor children are not permitted to visit unless they
are the children, stepchildren, grandchildren, or siblings of the inmate . . . .”).
147. See id. (“[F]ormer prisoners are not permitted to visit except that a
former prisoner who is an immediate family member of an inmate may visit if the
warden approves.”).
148. See id. (distinguishing prisoners with two or more substance-abuse
violations).
149. Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 148 F. Supp. 2d. 813 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
150. Id. at 859.
151. Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 286 F.3d 311 (6th Cir. 2002).
152. See Overton v. Bazetta, 539 U.S. 126, 126–27 (2003) (finding that the
facility’s regulations were constitutionally valid).
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penological goals.”153 The Court found that the regulations were
aimed at promoting internal security because they aimed to reduce
visitation, reduce the prevention of future crimes, and reduce the
smuggling of illegal substances into the prison.154
Second, the Court determined that the inmates had
alternative means of engaging in communication.155 The Court
stated that if alternative means did not exist, then the regulations
would be unreasonable, but that that was not the case.156 The
inmates could communicate with individuals that were not on the
approved list by sending messages to them through those
individuals that were on the approved list and by communicating
by letter and telephone.157 In response to the respondents’
argument that phone calls are brief and expensive, the Court
stated that “[a]lternatives to visitation need not be ideal . . . they
need only be available.”158
Third, the Court found that accommodating the respondents’
requests would cause a “significant reallocation of the prison
system’s financial resources” and “would impair the ability of
corrections officers to protect all who are inside a prison’s walls.”159
The Court went on to state that “[w]hen such consequences are
present, we are ‘particularly deferential’ to prison administrators’
regulatory judgments.”160
Fourth, the Court found that respondents had not met the
“high” standard of pointing to an “obvious regulatory alternative
153. See id. at 133–35 (“The regulations promote internal security, perhaps
the most legitimate of penological goals, by reducing the total number of visits
and by limiting the disruption caused by children in particular.”) (citations
omitted).
154. See id. (focusing on the justifications for the ban).
155. See id. at 135 (“Here, the alternatives are of sufficient utility that they
give some support to the regulations, particularly in a context where visitation is
limited, not completely withdrawn.”).
156. See id. (“Were it shown that no alternative means of communication
existed, though it would not be inclusive, it would be some evidence that the
regulations were unreasonable. That showing, however, cannot be made.”).
157. See id. (“Although this option is not available to inmates barred all
visitation after two violations, they and other inmates may communicate with
persons outside the prison by letter and telephone.”).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987)).
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that fully accommodates the asserted right while not imposing
more than a de minimis cost to the valid penological goal.”161 In
conclusion, the Court in Overton decided that the prison’s
restrictions on visitation did not violate the respondent’s
constitutional rights.162
Because of a “history of upholding limitations on visitation and
prisoner rights,”163 it is unlikely that U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Tennessee will find that the Knox County Jail
violated the Constitution when it banned in-person visitation. The
current case, however, is potentially distinguishable from Overton
because it appears that some of the factors of the Turner test weigh
in favor of the Knox County jail inmates.164
As for the first factor, Knox County has stated that the focus
of the ban on in-person visitation is to promote internal security by
reducing visitor traffic and the amount of illegal substances
entering the facility.165 The Supreme Court stated in Overton that
161. See id. at 136 (“[T]hese alternatives do not go so far toward
accommodating the asserted right with so little cost to penological goals that they
meet Turner’s high standard.”).
162. See id. at 126 (“The regulations satisfy each of four factors used to decide
whether a prison regulation affecting a constitutional right that survives
incarceration withstands constitutional challenge.”).
163. Chesa Boudin, Trevor Stutz & Aaron Littman, Prison Visitation Policies:
A Fifty-State Survey, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 153 (2013). See also Ky. Dep’t
of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 465 (1989) (holding that inmates do not have
a liberty interest in receiving visitors that is entitled to the protections of the Due
Process Clause); Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984) (finding a jail’s
blanket prohibition on contact visits to be constitutionally valid); Macedon v. Cal.
Dep’t of Corr., 67 F. App’x 407, 408 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming summary judgment
against an inmate’s challenge of the denial of family visits); Newman v. Alabama,
559 F.2d 283, 291 (5th Cir. 1997) (leaving visitation regulations to the discretion
of prison administrators); Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 420 (6th Cir. 1984)
(“Prison inmates have no absolute constitutional right to visitation.”); Ford v.
Beister, 657 F. Supp 607, 611 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (“[T]he Constitution does not
require that detainees be allowed contact visits . . . .”); Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437
F. Supp. 269, 322 (D.N.H. 1977) (allowing curtailment of visitation as punishment
but recognizing First Amendment limits); Craig v. Hocker, 405 F. Supp. 656, 674
(D. Nev. 1975) (“So long as there are reasonable alternative means of
communication, a prisoner has no First Amendment right to associate with
whomever he sees fit.”).
164. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (setting forth a four-factor test).
165. See FACE TO FACE KNOX, supra note 26, at 2 (“When the ban was initiated,
the Sheriff’s Office gave the following reasons for eliminating in-person visits:
Decreased visitation traffic—requires less staff[;] No contraband entering
jail[;] . . . Lessens chances for violence . . . .”).
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promoting internal security is the “most legitimate of penological
goals.”166 Knox County has stated a legitimate penological goal, but
its ban actually undermines that goal.167 The Court in Turner
stated that the legitimate goal and the regulation cannot be “so
remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational.”168 Statistics
show that the Knox County Jail’s ban on in-person visitation is
actually making the prison less safe.169 Assaults within the prison
have increased; mental health issues haves arisen among the
inmates; and contraband flows into the prison at the same rate it
did prior to the ban.170
Additionally, the ban is excessive. The ban is overly broad
because the jail, in its attempt to reduce contraband entering the
facility, has taken away in-person visitation from all those
detained, not just the ones who are a threat to bring contraband
into the facility.171 The ban is simultaneously too narrow because
it has not reduced the amount of contraband entering the facility,
which means that the ban has not successfully targeted the sources
of smuggled contraband.172
Because Knox County Jail’s ban undermines the county’s
legitimate penological goal and is excessive, it is arguable that the
ban is not reasonably related to the county’s goal. Therefore, it is
possible that the court will find that factor one weighs in favor of
the plaintiffs.
As for the second factor, the Knoxville County Jail has
provided alternative methods of communication to Knox County
inmates.173 Inmates can still communicate with family, friends,
166. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 127, 133 (2003).
167. See FACE TO FACE KNOX, supra note 26, at 3 (discussing how Knox County
Jail’s ban on in-person visitation has made the facility less safe).
168. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–90 (1987).
169. See FACE TO FACE KNOX, supra note 26, at 3 (“The ban has made the jail
less safe for both inmates and staff. The total rate of assaults increased by an
average of one assault per 100 inmates after the ban was enacted in April 2014.”).
170. FACE TO FACE KNOX, supra note 26 at 3, 6 (noting the rise in inmate-oninmate assaults as well as the drop in trust, intimacy, and social connection
between inmates and visitors).
171. See KNOX COUNTY SHERIFF, supra note 5, at 2 (“Knox County Correctional
Facilities use video visitation as the only method for personal visits.”).
172. See FACE TO FACE KNOX, supra note 26, at 3 (discussing Face to Face’s
findings).
173. See Knox County Corrections Division, KNOX COUNTY, TENN. SHERIFF,
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and others through video call, phone call, messaging, and by
letter.174 These alternatives were sufficient in Overton, where the
Court stated that “[a]lternatives to visitation need not be
ideal . . . they need only be available.”175 Therefore, it is likely that
factor two weighs in favor of Knox County.
As for the third factor of the Turner test, it is unclear what the
financial cost to the Knox County Jail would be. However, unlike
in Overton, the impact of the accommodating the inmates’ request
would not “impair the ability of corrections officers to protect all
who are inside the prison’s walls.”176 Again, the ban on in-person
visitation has made the jail less safe.177 Lifting the ban and
returning in-person visitation back to the jail would likely assist
the correctional officers in protecting the facility and those within
it. Therefore, it is arguable that factor three weighs in favor of the
plaintiffs.
As for the fourth factor of the Turner test, it is likely that the
plaintiffs can meet the “high” standard of pointing to an “obvious
regulatory alternative that fully accommodates the asserted right
while not imposing more than a de minimis cost to the valid
penological goal”178 because reimplementing in-person visitation
would arguably promote Knox County Jail’s legitimate penological
goal by making the facility safer. Therefore, it is arguable that
factor four weighs in the plaintiffs’ favor.
In conclusion, because of the significant deference given to jail
administrators by the courts,179 it will be difficult for the plaintiffs
to prove that the Turner test’s four factors weigh in their favor.
Still, it is arguable that Knox County’s ban is not rationally related
http://www.knoxsheriff.org/jail/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2019) (listing information
for various methods of communication) [https://perma.cc/PW96-66G8].
174. See id. (listing information on telephoning, messaging, and mailing a
letter to an inmate in Knox County Jail).
175. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 135 (2003).
176. Id.
177. See FACE TO FACE KNOX, supra note 26, at 3 (discussing Face to Face
Knox’s findings).
178. Overton, 539 U.S. at 136 (2003).
179. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987) (“Prison administration is,
moreover, a task that has been committed to the responsibility of those branches,
and separation of powers concerns counsel a policy of judicial restraint. Where a
state penal system is involved, federal courts have . . . additional reason to accord
deference to the appropriate prison authorities.”).
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to its legitimate penological goal and that reinstating in-person
visitation would more successfully further the county’s legitimate
penological goal.
2. Bell v. Wolfish Test
As stated earlier, it is unlikely that a court would find that
Knox County Jail’s ban on in-person visitation violates the First
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment regarding convicted
detainees. However, the Supreme Court has applied a different
test when determining if a facility’s regulations violate the
constitutional rights of pretrial detainees.180
In Bell v. Wolfish, the Supreme Court discussed the principles
regarding rights of pretrial detainees and the standard of review
courts must use in determining if a jail regulation violates the
constitutional rights of pretrial detainees.181 In Wolfish, the
plaintiffs filed a class action law suit in the Southern District of
New York challenging the legality of conditions facing pretrial
detainees in a New York City federal correctional facility.182 The
plaintiffs challenged the Metropolitan Correctional Facility’s
practice of putting two inmates in cells intended to house only one
inmate, restrictions that required that inmates could only receive
reading materials from approved publishers, room searches in the
absence of the inmates, and required cavity searches.183
The district court held that because the detainees are
“presumed to be innocent and held only to ensure their presence at
trial, ‘any deprivation or restriction of rights beyond those which
are necessary for confinement alone, must be justified by a
compelling necessity.’”184 Applying that rule, the court enjoined the
180. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
181. See id. at 520 (“In evaluating the constitutionality of conditions or
restrictions of pretrial detention that implicates only the protection against
deprivation of liberty without due process of law, the proper inquiry is whether
those conditions or restrictions amount to punishment of the detainee.”).
182. United States ex rel. Wolfish v. United States, 428 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
183. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 527 (“The petition served up a veritable potpourri
of complaints that implicated virtually every facet of the institution’s conditions
and practices.”).
184. United States ex rel. Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp. 114, 124 (S.D.N.Y.
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double-bunking practice and the publisher-only rule on a partial
motion for summary judgment.185 After trial, the court enjoined the
practice of requiring inmates to expose their body cavities for
visual inspection following contact visits and granted relief in favor
of pretrial detainees with respect to the requirement that
detainees remain outside their rooms during room inspection.186
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.187
The Supreme Court addressed whether the conditions of
confinement violated the individual liberty, due process, and
privacy of pretrial detainees as protected by the First, Fourth, and
Fifth Amendments through the Fourteenth Amendment.188
The Supreme Court stated four principles regarding the rights
of pretrial detainees.189 First, pre-trial detainees do not forfeit all
constitutional protections by reason of their confinement.190
Second, those rights are subject to restrictions and limitations.191
Third, “maintaining institutional security and preserving internal
order and discipline are essential goals that may require limitation
or retraction of the retained constitutional rights of . . . pretrial
detainees.”192 Fourth, deference must be shown to the correctional
facility’s officials, even when they have no expertise.193
1977) (quoting Detainees of Brooklyn House of Detention v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d
392, 397 (2d Cir. 1975)).
185. United States ex rel. Wolfish, 428 F. Supp. at 344
To summarize: Upon the cross motions before the court, petitioners
are entitled to a partial decree enjoining (a) double celling, (b)
enforcement of the “publishers only” rule, (c) failure to give receipts for
seized property, and (d) the practices respecting mail hereinabove
found to be invalid.
186. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 528 (1979) (discussing procedural
history).
187. Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1978).
188. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 524 (“We granted certiorari to consider the
important constitutional questions raised by these decisions and to resolve an
apparent conflict among the Circuits.”).
189. See id. at 545 (“Our cases have established several general principles
that inform our evaluation of the constitutionality of the restrictions at issue.”).
190. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555–56 (1974) (“There is no iron
curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country.”).
191. See Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948) (“Lawful incarceration
brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and
rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying the penal system.”).
192. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979).
193. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974) (“Such considerations are
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The Supreme Court stated that the essential objectives of
pretrial confinement are ensuring that the detainee is present at
trial and effectively managing the detention facility once the
individual is confined.194 Where an individual is lawfully
committed to pretrial detention, “the Government concededly may
detain him to ensure his presence at trial and may subject him to
the restrictions and conditions of the detention facility so long as
those conditions and restrictions do not amount to punishment, or
otherwise violate the Constitution.”195
The Supreme Court also discussed the test that courts must
apply when determining whether a jail’s regulation violates
constitutional rights of pretrial detainees.196 Where there is no
showing of an expressed intent to punish on the part of the
correctional facility, the court must determine whether the Court
has a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose and whether
the challenged policy is rationally related to that purpose.197
Therefore, “if a particular condition or restriction of pretrial
detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental
objective, it does not, without more, amount to punishment.”198 If,
however, the restriction is not reasonably related to a legitimate
goal because it is “excessive,”199 “arbitrary,”200 or “purposeless,”201
then the court can infer that the purpose of the governmental

peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials,
and, in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the
officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts should
ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters.”).
194. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 539–40 (“[W]e do not accept respondents’ argument
that the Government’s interest in ensuring a detainee’s presence at trial is the
only objective that may justify restraints and conditions once the decision is
lawfully made to confine a person.”).
195. Id. at 536–37.
196. See id. at 561 (discussing the Bell v. Wolfish test).
197. See id. (“Therefore, the determination whether these restrictions and
practices constitute punishment in the constitutional sense depends on whether
they are rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose and
whether they appear excessive in relation to that purpose.”).
198. Id. at 539.
199. Id. at 561.
200. Id. at 539.
201. Id.
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action is punishment and cannot constitutionally be inflicted on
the pretrial detainees.202
The Court found that the double-bunking practice,203 the
publisher-only rule,204 the practice of searching rooms in absence
of the pretrial detainees,205 and the practice of performing cavity
searches after contact visitation206 did not amount to punishment
of the pretrial detainees.207 The Court held that each challenged
policy was supported by a legitimate government interest, which
was ensuring security and order, and that the challenged policies
were reasonably related to that purpose.208 The Court held that
courts must rely on facilities’ judgment calls, which are “confided
to officials outside of the Judicial Branch of Government.”209
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed whether a
jail’s blanket prohibition of in-person visitation violates the
constitutional rights of pre-trial detainees, in Block v.
Rutherford,210 it addressed whether a jail’s blanket prohibition of
contact visitation violates pretrial detainees’ constitutional
rights.211 The Supreme Court considered whether a county jail’s
blanket prohibition of contact visitation between pre-trial
detainees and their spouses, relatives, children, and friends, was
constitutionally valid.212 The plaintiffs in Block brought a class
202. See id. (“Conversely, if a restriction or condition is not reasonably related
to a legitimate goal—if it is arbitrary or purposeless—a court permissibly may
infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment that may not
constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua detainees.”).
203. Id. at 541–43.
204. Id. at 548–52.
205. Id. at 555–57.
206. Id. at 558–60.
207. Id. at 562.
208. See id. at 561 (“Ensuring security and order at the institution is a
permissible nonpunitive objective, whether the facility houses pretrial detainees,
convicted detainees, or both.”).
209. Id. at 562.
210. See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 591 (1984) (finding that pretrial
detainees do not have a constitutional right to contact visitation).
211. See id. at 586 (“[O]ur inquiry is simply whether petitioners’ blanket
prohibition on contact visits at Central Jail is reasonably related to the security
of that facility.”).
212. See id. (“The question before us, therefore, is narrow: whether the
prohibition of contact visits is reasonably related to legitimate governmental
objectives.”).
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action suit against the Los Angeles County Jail challenging its ban
on contact visitation.213 The jail claimed that its ban was based on
the need to reduce the introduction of contraband and weapons
into the facility.214
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California found for the plaintiffs and agreed that “the ability of a
man to embrace his wife and children from time to time during the
weeks or months while he is awaiting trial is a matter of great
importance to him.”215 The court held that the county jail’s ban on
contact visitation was “‘excessive’ in relation to the underlying
security objectives” and characterized the jail’s rejection of all
proposals for contact visitation as an “unreasonable fixation upon
security.”216 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed, suggesting that a “blanket prohibition of contact
visits for all detainees would be an unreasonable, exaggerated
response to security concerns . . . .”217
The Supreme Court disagreed and held that “the Constitution
does not require that detainees be allowed contact visits when
responsible, experienced administrators have determined, in their
sound discretion, that such visits will jeopardize the security of the
facility.”218 The Court held that the ban was supported by the
government’s legitimate interest to keep weapons and contraband
from being smuggled into the county jail by visitors and that the
ban was not excessive.219
Similar to what is stated in Section V.C.1 of this Note, it is
unlikely that the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District on
Tennessee will find that Knox County’s ban on in-person visitation
violates the constitutional rights of pretrial detainee plaintiffs
213. See id. at 576 (“Respondents, pretrial detainees at the Los Angeles
County Central Jail, brought a class action in Federal District Court against the
County Sheriff and other officials, challenging, on due process grounds, the jail's
policy of denying pretrial detainees contact visits . . . .”).
214. See id. at 586 (“[T]here is no dispute that internal security of detention
facilities is a legitimate governmental interest . . . .”).
215. Rutherford v. Pitchess, 457 F. Supp. 104, 110 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
216. Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 581 (1984).
217. Rutherford v. Pitchess, 710 F.2d 572, 577 (9th Cir. 1983).
218. Block, 468 U.S. at 589.
219. See id. at 588 (“In sum, we conclude that petitioners’ blanket prohibition
is an entirely reasonable, nonpunitive response to the legitimate security
concerns identified, consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
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because, under the test established in Bell v. Wolfish, courts give
significant deference to the jail administration.220
The first prong to address is whether Knox County Jail had a
legitimate government purpose when it created its ban against
in-person visitation.221 Knox County Jail claims that the purpose
of its ban on in-person visitation is to increase the security of the
facility and reduce contraband entering the facility.222 Because this
claimed purpose is the same as the one in Overton v. Bazzetta,223
Block v. Rutherford,224 and Bell v. Wolfish,225 the purpose is a
legitimate government interest.
The next prong to address is whether the ban on in-person
visitation is rationally related to the government’s legitimate
purpose of reducing contraband and increasing the facility’s
security.226 It is arguable that the ban is not rationally related to
the government’s purpose of increasing the facility’s security.
Statistics show that since the ban was implemented, assaults
within the jail have increased; that the mental health of the jail’s
220. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979)
[P]roblems that arise in the day-to-day operations of a corrections
facility are not susceptible
of
easy solutions.
Prison
administrators . . . should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the
adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment
are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and maintain
institutional security.
221. See id. at 561 (“Therefore, the determination whether these restrictions
and practices constitute punishment in the constitutional sense depends on
whether they are rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental
purpose . . . .”).
222. See FACE TO FACE KNOX, supra note 26, at 2 (“When the ban was initiated,
the Sheriff’s Office gave the following reasons for eliminating in-person visits:
Decreased visitation traffic—requires less staff[;] No contraband entering
jail[;] . . . Lessens chances for violence . . . .”).
223. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 133 (2003) (“The regulations
promote internal security, perhaps the most legitimate of penological goals . . . .”).
224. See Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984) (“[T]here is no dispute
that internal security of detention facilities is a legitimate governmental interest
. . . .”).
225. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 561 (“Ensuring security and order at the institution
is a permissible nonpunitive objective, whether the facility houses pretrial
detainees, convicted inmates, or both.”).
226. See id. (“Therefore, the determination whether these restrictions and
practices constitute punishment in the constitutional sense depends on whether
they are rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose and
whether they appear excessive in relation to that purpose.”).
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inmates has worsened; and that contraband has continued to flow
into the jail at same rate as it did prior to the ban.227 Additionally,
the ban is excessive because it is simultaneously too broad and too
narrow. It targets those who are not responsible for smuggling in
contraband while simultaneously not being able to prevent those
who are smuggling contraband into the facility from doing so.228
Because of the “wide-ranging deference”229 courts give jail
administrators, it is difficult for plaintiffs to prove that a
correctional facility has not met the requirement of the Bell v.
Wolfish Test.230 However, because the plaintiffs in this case can
demonstrate that Knox County Jail’s legitimate government
interest was not rationally related to its ban and was excessive,
then there is a chance that the plaintiffs can prove that the Knox
County Jail’s ban on in-person visitation constituted punishment.
D. Does Knox County’s Ban on In-Person Visitation Violate the
Eighth Amendment’s Protection Against Cruel and Unusual
Punishment?
The Eighth Amendment states, “Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.”231 The Eighth Amendment also imposes
duties on prison officials to “provide humane conditions of
confinement;” “ensure that inmates receive adequate food,

227. See FACE TO FACE KNOX, supra note 26, at 3 (discussing Face to Face
Knox’s findings).
228. See FACE TO FACE KNOX, supra note 26, at 3 (discussing the lack of change
in the amount of contraband entering the jail after the ban of in-person visitation).
229. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979) (“Prison administrators
therefore should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and
execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve
internal order and discipline and maintain institutional security.”).
230. See id. at 547–48 (“Such considerations are peculiarly within the
province and professional expertise of corrections officials, and, in the absence of
substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated
their response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their
expert judgment in such matters.” quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827
(1974)).
231. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

374

26 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 339 (2019)

clothing, shelter, and medical care;” and “take reasonable
measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.”232
To determine whether the government has violated the Eighth
Amendment, the Supreme Court has applied a different test than
the Turner v. Safley test.233 In Overton, prisoners claimed that the
restriction on visitation for inmates that had two substance-abuse
violations violated the Eighth Amendment because it was a “cruel
and unusual condition of confinement in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.”234 The Supreme Court held that although the
restriction “undoubtedly [made] the prisoner’s confinement more
difficult to bear,” it did not fail to meet the standards mandated by
the Eighth Amendment.235 The Court stated that the withdrawal
of privileges for a limited period as means of effecting prison
discipline is not a “dramatic departure from accepted standards for
conditions of confinement.”236 The Court also stated that the
restriction did not create inhumane prison conditions; did not
deprive inmates of basic necessities; did not fail to protect the
inmates’ health or safety; and did not involve the infliction of pain
or injury, or deliberate indifference to the risk that it might
occur.237 However, the Court suggested that “if the withdrawal of
all visitation privileges were permanent or for a much longer
period, or if it were applied in an arbitrary manner to a particular
inmate, the case would present different considerations.”238
In their book Prisoners’ Self-Help Litigation Manual, authors
John Boston and Daniel Manville claim that courts have been more
sympathetic to inmates confined in county jails with “extremely

232. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).
233. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 136 (2003) (avoiding application
of the Turner test to the cruel and unusual punishment context).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 137.
237. See id. (listing additional considerations).
238. Id.
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limited visiting opportunities.”239 In Jackson v. Gardner,240 the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee
ruled that the Sullivan County Jail violated the Eighth
Amendment’s
prohibition
against
cruel
and
unusual
241
punishment. One of the conditions that led to this finding was
that inmates were limited to only one non-contact visit per week
with blood relatives for fifteen minutes.242 In response, the district
court ordered that the Sullivan County Jail increase visitation for
its inmates.243
Additionally, in Laaman v. Helgemre,244 the district court
determined that extreme limitations on the right to visitation can
“threaten the mental and emotional stability of the inmates.”245
The court ruled that a state violates the Eighth Amendment when
its visitation policy fails “to allow inmates to keep their community
and family bonds,” which would “promote[ ] degeneration” and
“decrease[ ] [inmates] chances of successful integration into
society.”246
239. JOHN BOSTON & DANIEL E. MANVILLE, PRISONER’S SELF-HELP LITIGATION
MANUAL 221 (4th ed. 2010); see also Morrow v. Harwell, 768 F.2d 619, 626–27
(5th Cir. 1985) (requiring weekend visits); Jackson v. Gardner, 639 F. Supp. 1005,
1012 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (requiring increased visits); McMurry v. Phelps, 533 F.
Supp. 742, 764 (W.D. La. 1982) (finding that thirty minutes of visitation per week
was inadequate, requiring hours accessible to workers, and condemning lack of
privacy and difficulty seeing or hearing); Dawson v. Kendrick, 527 F. Supp. 1252,
1309 (S.D. W. Va. 1981) (ordering corrections to obstructions of sight and
hearing); Nicholson v. Choctaw County, 498 F. Supp. 295, 310 (S.D. Ala. 1980)
(finding that two sessions of two hours of visitation weekly were inadequate and
requiring weekend, evening, and holiday visits).
240. See Jackson v. Gardner, 639 F. Supp. 1005, 1009 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (“The
Court finds, from the facts outlined above that the conditions of confinement at
the Sullivan County Jail violate the rights of those confined to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.”).
241. See id. at 1010 (stating that whether prison conditions amount to cruel
and unusual punishment must be determined “from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society”).
242. See id. at 1008 (“The majority . are allowed only one non-contact visit
per week for fifteen minutes. This single weekly visit is limited to blood
relatives.”).
243. See id. at 1012 (“[V]isitation must be increased . . ..”).
244. See Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 322 (D.N.H. 1977) (finding
that a total denial of visitation would violate the Constitution).
245. Id. at 321.
246. Id. at 320.
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The ban at the Knox County Jail has caused Knox County
inmates to suffer from mental health issues,247 it has increased
violence within the facility,248 and it has disrupted inmate’s ability
to keep their community and family bonds.249 Also, it is arguable
that the ban does permanently withdrawal all visitation from the
inmates because the video visitation they are provided is
insufficient and is inferior when compared to in-person
visitation.250 Therefore, the plaintiffs can possibly successfully
argue that Knox County’s ban violates the Eighth Amendment
regarding convicted detainees located within the jail.
It is unnecessary to consider whether Knox County’s ban
violates the Eighth Amendment regarding pretrial detainees
because any punishment of a pretrial detainee is prohibited.251
VI. Alternative Challenges to Bans on In-Person Visitation
Because of the difficulty of succeeding on constitutional
challenges, the most effective path to defeating bans on in-person
visitation is by individuals and organizations persuading
administrative agencies and legislatures to abandon and avoid
policies that ban in-person visitation. Several state legislatures
have made attempts to enact legislation prohibiting bans on
in-person visitation.
247. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 8 (discussing the mental
and physical deterioration of Alonzo Hoskins).
248. See FACE TO FACE KNOX, supra note 26, at 3 (discussing the rise in
assaults).
249. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7 at 8
The stress of being cut off from his family and the living conditions he
is forced to endure at the Knox county Facilities have caused him to
lose weight, lose hair, have difficulty sleeping, and caused him to suffer
from depression and mental health issues so severe that he requires
medication.
250. See Widra, supra note 71 (“While there are benefits to video
communication, primarily regarding long-distance communication, psychologists
have repeatedly found numerous differences between face-to-face and video
communication.”).
251. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 (1979) (“[T]he Government
concededly may detain [a pretrial detainee] to ensure his presence at trial and
may subject him to the restrictions and conditions of the detention facility so long
as those conditions and restrictions do not amount to punishment, or otherwise
violate the Constitution.”).
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In 2015, the Texas state legislature passed House Bill 549,
which requires county jails in the state to provide incarcerated
people with a minimum of two twenty-minute in-person visits per
week, with exceptions for counties that, as of September 1, 2015,
have “incurred significant design, engineering or construction
costs to provide visitation that does not comply with a rule or
procedure adopted under Subsection (a)(20), or does not have the
physical plant capability to provide the in-person prison visitation
required by a rule or procedure adopted under Subsection
(a)(20).”252
In California’s state legislature, state senator Holly Mitchell
recently led the charge to pass Senate Bill 1157, Strengthening
Family Connections.253 That bill would have protected in-person
visitation rights in California county jails and guaranteed that
video visitation did not replace in-person visitation.254
Unfortunately, it was vetoed by Governor Jerry Brown because “a
statutory mandate on local jail operations would be too
inflexible.”255 The California state legislature, however, remains
undeterred. In February 2019, Assembly Member Jose Medina
introduced AB-964, which “would require all local detention
facilities to offer in-person visitation” and would “give any facility
that does not offer in-person visitation until January 1, 2025, to
comply with this requirement.”256
There have also been efforts in Congress to challenge bans on
in-person visitation.257 U.S. Senator Tammy Duckworth
252. H.R. 549, 2015, Leg., 84th Sess. (Tex. 2015).
253. See Strengthening Family Connections in California, NATION INSIDE,
https://nationinside.org/campaign/strengthening-family-connections/ (last visited
Nov. 24, 2019) (“The mission of the Strengthening Family Connections: In-Person
Visitation Campaign is to pass SB 1157 in California, introduced by California
State Senator Holly Mitchell, which will protect in-person visitation rights in
California county jails, ensuring that video visitation cannot replace in-person
visitation.”) [https://perma.cc/2BQ7-8DJR].
254. See id. (stating the bill’s mission).
255. The Times Editorial Board, Editorial, Banning In-Person Jail Visits is
Foolish and Needlessly Cruel, L.A. TIMES (May 30, 2017, 4:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-video-jail-visits-20170530story.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2019) [https://perma.cc/XPT7-W7V9].
256. Assemb. B. 964, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
257. H.R.6441—Video Visitation in Prisons Act of 2016, CONGRESS.GOV (Dec.
6, 2016), https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/6441/text (last
visited Nov. 24, 2019) [https://perma.cc/XX48-YQ5W].
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introduced the Video Visitation in Prisons Act of 2016, which is
currently navigating through the federal legislative process.258
That Act would require the Federal Communications Commission
to regulate video visits and the Federal Bureau of Prisons to
continue to provide in-person visitation and only use video services
as a supplement to in-person visitation.259
In addition to legislative attempts to prohibit bans on
in-person visitation, some county jail administrators have made
the decision to abandon the bans. On April 19, 2016, the Travis
County Jail in Texas, which was included in the exemption
provision of Texas’s prohibition on bans on in-person visitation,
ended its video-only visitation policy.260 Only a few days later, on
April 22, the Adams County Jail in Mississippi abandoned its
Homewav video visitation program in favor of a traditional jail
visitation program.261 Adams County Sheriff Travis Patten stated,
“A lot of people couldn’t afford those [video] calls. . . . We know that
if someone is in the jail they’ve done something to be there, but I
think everybody should have the right to check in on their child
and make sure they’re ok.”262 On January 16, 2019, the sheriff for
Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, Gary McFadden, kept his
campaign promise and abandoned the county’s ban on in-person
visitation.263 Sheriff McFadden stated that in-person visitation
258. See id. (“Latest Action: House—12/22/2016,
Referred
to
the
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations.”).
259. See id. (creating “[a] prohibition against a provider of a covered service
requiring a correctional facility to restrict in-person visitation as a condition of
providing such service in such facility”).
260. See Alison Walsh, In-Person Visits Return to Jails in Travis County,
Texas,
PRISON
POL’Y
INITIATIVE
(Apr.
19,
2016),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2016/04/19/in-person-visits-return-to-jails-intravis-county-texas/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2019) (“This morning marked the end
of the county’s video-only visitation policy and the first time since 2013 that
people incarcerated in the county’s jails were able to see their loved ones through
a plexiglass window instead of a computer screen.”) [https://perma.cc/LCZ5GS5C].
261. See Vershal Hogan, Sheriff to Discontinue Video Visitation at Jail, THE
NATCHEZ
DEMOCRAT
(Apr.
22,
2016),
https://www.natchezdemocrat.com/2016/04/22/sheriff-to-discontinue-videovisitation-at-jail/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2019) (reporting on Adams County’s
implementation of the ban, its abandonment of the ban, and its proposed policy
that would replace the ban) [https://perma.cc/66AC-GHV2].
262. Id.
263. See In-Person Visitations Restored at Mecklenburg County Jails, Sheriff’s
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improves public safety, reduces recidivism, and reduces the
likelihood that an inmate will commit an infraction inside of the
jail.264
Going forward, whether bans on in-person visitation will
remain in place or be abandoned greatly depends on the efforts of
individuals and organizations persuading their state and federal
law makers to prohibit the bans.
VII. Conclusion
Where correctional facilities, such as the Knox County Jail,
create bans on in-person visitation and replace it with video
visitation, the inmates and their families suffer. These bans
increase mental distress,265 recidivism rates,266 and financial
hardships,267 while also bringing in lucrative commissions268 for
the facilities that enact them.269 Because of these burdens, it is
imperative that individuals and organizations come forward to
challenge these bans.

Office Says, WFAE 90.7 (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.wfae.org/post/personvisitations-restored-mecklenburg-county-jails-sheriffs-office-says#stream/0 (last
visited Nov. 24, 2019) (reporting on Mecklenburg County’s implementation of the
ban, its abandonment of the ban, and its proposed policy that would replace the
ban) [https://perma.cc/CUS4-NFNB].
264. See id. (listing the benefits of in-person visitation).
265. See FACE TO FACE KNOX, supra note 26, at 3 (discussing Face to Face’s
findings); see also Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 8 (discussing the
mental and physical deterioration of Alonzo Hoskins).
266. See MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 81, at 29 (“[F]indings suggest that
prison visitation can improve recidivism outcomes by helping offenders not only
maintain social ties with both nuclear and extended family . . . while
incarcerated, but also by developing new bonds such as those with clergy or
mentors.”).
267. See Complaint for Plaintiffs, supra note 7, at 14 (discussing the burdens
caused by the expensiveness of the services).
268. See FACE TO FACE KNOX, supra note 26, at 2
Under the County’s current contract with [Securus], the County takes
a 50% “commission” on every remote video call, which goes into the
County’s general revenue fund. Because Securus pays the full cost of
installing and operating the system, there is no need for the county to
charge an extra fee.
269. Id.
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Because of the “wide ranging deference”270 given to
correctional facility administrators, it is unlikely that the plaintiffs
will be successful on constitutional challenges to these bans.271 The
bans, however, can be successfully defeated through the political
process by individuals and organizations persuading their
legislatures and administrative agencies to provide inmates with
access to in-person visitation.

270. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1974) (“Prison administrators
therefore should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and
execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve
internal order and discipline and maintain institutional security.”).
271. See id. at 547–48 (“Such considerations are peculiarly within the
province and professional expertise of corrections officials, and, in the absence of
substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated
their response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their
expert judgment in such matters.”) (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827
(1974)).

